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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRED BUTZ, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
7441 
;STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Parties will be designated as plaintiff and defendant. 
All italics appearing in the brief are added. 
Fred Butz, an employee of the defendant, 66 years 
of age, was injured while engaged in the performance 
of his duties as a switchman at the Union Station, Den-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
ver, Colorado, at 7 :55 o'clock A.M. on the 9th day of 
September, 1948. He brought action under the Federal 
Employer's Liability Act against defendant in the Dis-
trict Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt 
Lake County, Utah, and following presentation of the 
plaintiff's evidence before a jury the Court granted 
defendant's motion for nonsuit (R. 133, 134), and judg-
ment was accordingly entered against the plaintiff. 
In his com,plaint plaintiff alleged that he was in-
jured while engaged with other members of his crew in 
shoving a cut of three cars in a general westerly 'di-
rection along the outside baggage track by use of a 
locomotiye also facing westward, and while he was sta-
tioned on the sill step on the north side at the west end 
of the lead car, and that he was injured as a result of the 
negligence and carelessness of defendant in allowing 
ten baggage trucks to be left along the platform adjacent 
to and north of said outside baggage track in a position 
so near the north rail of said track as to impair the 
clearance and thus endanger men riding on the north side 
of cars moving in a westerly direction along said track. 
By answer defendant admitted that it was engaged 
as a common carrier by railroad in interstate commerce 
at the time of the accident and that plaintiff suffered 
injuries, but denied that the injuries were occasioned 
by its negligence, and affirmatively alleged that plain-
tiff's o~ contributory negligenc.e was the sole proximate 
cause of hisjnjuries (R. 12, 13). 
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Upon the admitted facts the remedy afforded plain-
tiff is controlled by certain provisions of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act. For the convenience of the 
Court these controlling provisions-, as far as material 
here, are set forth herein: 
Se_ction 51, Title 45, U.S.C.A.: 
''Every common carrier by -railroad while 
-engaging in commerce between any of the several 
States * * * shall be liable in damages to any 
person suffering injury while he is em_ployed by 
such carrier in such commerce, * * * for .such 
injury * * * resulting in whole or ~ part from 
the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or 
employees· of such carrier, or by reason of- ap.y 
defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its 
cars, engines, ·a pp·liances, machinery, track, road-
bed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.'' 
Section 53, Title 45, U.S.C.A.: 
''In all actions hereafter brought against any 
such common carrier by· r:;tilroad under or by 
virtue of any of the provisions of this chapter to 
recover dam~ges for personal injuries to an em-
ployee, or where such injuries have resulted in 
his death, the fact that the employee may have 
heen guilty of contributory negligence shall not 
bar a recovery, but the damages shall be dimin-
ished by the jury iri proportion to the amount 
of negligence attributable to such employee: Pro-
vided, that no such employee who may be i~jured 
or killed shall be held to have been guilty of 
contributory negligence in any case where the yio-
lation by such. common carrier of any -statute 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
enacted for the safety of employees contributed 
to the injury or death of such employee.'' 
At the ·conclusion of plaintiff's evidence defendant 
made a motion for nonsuit, which the trial court granted 
(R. 133, 134). 
It will become readily apparent to this Court after 
a review of the facts that the trial court committed 
prejudicial and reversible error in granting defendant's 
motion for nonsuit. 
B. THE FACTS 
Plaintiff, Fred Butz, at the time of his injuries, 
was 66 years of age, with 45 years Qf railroading exper-
ience (R. 41), and was familiar with every track at the 
Union Station and upon the Union Pacific system at 
Denver, Colorado (R. 43). 
The accident ~ausing his injuries occurred at ap-
proximately 7:55 o'clock A.M. on the 9th day of Sep-
tember, 1948 (lt. 33), on defendant's outside baggage 
track at the Union !S~tation, Denver, Colorado (R. 1, 2, 
11, 12). ·The outside baggage track extends in a genetal 
easterly-westerly direction, with a loading platform ad-
jacent to and north of said track. A few feet east of the 
platform the said baggage tr~ck eircles to the northeast 
(R. 42, Ex. "A"). 
O'n September 9, 1948 plaintiff reported for work at 
approximately ;6:30 o'clock A.M. (R. 46). Shortly after 
his arrival a p~assenger train came into the station and 
it became tne duty of plaintiff's crew to shove three 
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baggage cars from said train in a westerly direction to 
and along the outside baggage track and to spot them 
along the platform (R. -17). Plaintiff was working as a 
fieldman. 
It is the customary and usual procedure for the 
fieldman to ride the point car in the direction of the 
movement in order that he may keep a lookout ahead for 
obstructions on the track and p·ass necessary sjgnals to 
the engineer (R. 48, 53, 97). It was also customary for 
plaintiff and other of defendant's em'P·loyees to ride cuts 
of cars along and past the platform heretofore men.,. 
tioned. In accordance with said custom plaintiff sta-
tioned himself upon the ~ill step located on the north 
side near the west end of the leading car (R. 50, 51). 
The haggage platform where the cars were ulti-
mately to be spotted is used for loading and unloading 
cars brought to the Denver Union Terminal hy the Burl-
. · ington, Colorado & Southern, Denver and Rio Grande, 
Rock Island and Union Pacific Railroad Comp·anies. 
On some days plaintiff and his crew would use the out-
side 'baggage track in spotting cars as often as six times. 
On other days they wouldn't use the track (R. 49). 
After cars from any of said railroads are spotted along 
the rplatform, employees of the Denver Union Terminal 
load and unload them before they are moved to their 
next points of departure. 
Baggage trucks are used in loading and unloading 
cars stationed along the loading platform. These trucks 
are approximately eight feet in length, three to three 
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and one-half feet in width and stand about three feet 
from the ground, with end pieces extending up from 
the decks an additional three to three and one-half 
feet. They weigh from 500 up to 1500 pounds (R. ·52). 
These trucks may be seen in Exhibits "A," "B" -and 
''C.'' They belong to the Denver Union Terminal Com-
pany and are handled by employees of the Denver Union 
Terminal Company (R. 102). 
The cut of cars plaintiff was riding had proceeded 
west ap·proximately two miles before it reached the plat-
form where plaintiff was injured (R. 49). As the cut 
ap'proached the platform and rounded the curve shown 
in Exhibit "A," plaintiff observed a string of baggage 
trucks standing lengthwise, and end to end, along the 
platform, but continued to ride the sill step on the lead-
ing car as he believed that the baggage trucks were in 
their usual position within the safety zone on the plat-
form (R. ·53, 79). 
A yellow line is painted along the platform as shown 
in Exhibit "B" and "C" which defines the safety zone 
for baggage trucks. Whenever these trucks are parked 
between the yellow line and the south edge of the plat-
form they constitute an impairment of clearance for men 
'riding the sides of the cars along said platform and past 
said trucks (R. 15, 16). While plaintiff was rounding 
the curve he . was in, no position to sight along the plat-
form and determine whether or not the trucks were 
beyond the yellow line and in the danger zone. As he 
rounded the curve, moved onto the straight track and 
came abreast of the first of th·ese trucks he observed 
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that they "~ere all beyond the yellow line and in the 
dange·r zone (R. 55, 100). At that time the engine and 
cars were proceeding at a speed of not less than five 
miles per hour (R. 55). He had been looking ahead 
along the entire track ( R. 101). ij:e testified regarding 
the happening of the accident as follows (R. 56, 57) :. 
''A. Well when I got right around the curve 
to the straight track I was right up against these 
trucks mostly. I didn't have enough time to 
jump off because there wasn't enough room in 
between there, between the baggage car and these 
little trucks, so I tried to take my arms off to 
give a signal and just at that time I couldn't give 
a signal. I then tried to reach around the corner, 
then one of the trucks hit me on the elbow. 
Q. Now which elbow~ 
A. Oh my right elbow, here along the back 
when I hit this truck when I started to reach 
around the corner and hit this truck why I hit 
the fourth truck and then it pushed the fifth one 
even in closer to the· track and then I had ahold 
with both hands and I was so scared I tried to 
get around the corner so I could .pass that and 
the fifth truck hit me with all force in ~y side here 
and in the hack and at particular time the engi-
neer, the foreman of the crew, he seen what hap-
pened and he give the engineer the sign and I 
think the engineer seen it about the same time 
and he put on the air and stopp·ed. 
* * * * 
''A. When I seen these were too close I 
squoze in and I made it by the three trucks when 
I seen the fourth truck then I tried to get around 
the corner of the car which I seen I couldn't 
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make and I got hit by the fourth truck on the 
elbow and just about that time I got to the fifth 
truck and it struck me on my back.'' 
The first of said trucks was approximately ten feet 
from the curve which he had to round before being 
able to sight down the platform and determine the clear-
ance between the track and the baggage trucks (R. 59). 
Plaintiff did not step down onto the platform when he 
first became aware that the baggage trucks were beyond 
the yellow line because at that time he was passing the 
first of said trucks and would have risked falling against 
the trucks and under the wheels of the cut of cars. 
It was impossible for him to swing around in front of 
th·e cars because he didn't have sufficient time and doing 
so would have involved considerable danger (R. 59, 60). 
The corner of the fourth truck which struck plain-
tiff was approximately halfway between the yellow line 
and the side of the car, which would place it six or eight 
inches over the yellow line. The fifth truck which struck 
plaintiff in the ba:ck was only six or eight inches from 
the side of the baggage car (R. 68, 69). The point of 
impact with the fourth truck is indicated by a dot and 
the words "Point of first impact" on Exhibit "A." 
Plaintiff had a good tight grip on the grab-iron at 
the time he was struck by the haggage trucks and man-
aged to hold onto the car until the cut was stopped. (R. 
91). 
After the accident plaintiff worked for an hour 
and a half until his condition became such that he could 
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9 
no longer stand the pain (R. 60, 61). His switch key 
had been driven into his right leg causing severe pain 
(R. 61). 
At the time of trial, almost five months after the 
accident, he \Yas still unable to return to work. The 
lower p·ortion of his back was still bothering him consid-
erably and he had suffered permanent injury in the 
area of his thigh where the switch key had entered (R. 
63, 68, 113). Pr. Clegg testified that plaintiff had suf-
fered a serious injury in the lower portion of his spine 
(R. 106), which was aggravated and rendered. more diffi-
cult to heal by an osteo-arthritic condition (R. 108, 111, 
112). Plaintiff's right elbow had been severly injured 
and was still painful rendering his right arm difficult of 
use at the time of trial (R. 109). 
It is apparent from the above recitation of the evi-
dence that the necessary elements of plaintiff's case 
rested firmly upon a substantial evidentiary basis. 
When plaintiff had rested, the defendant moved for 
a nonsuit and the court _granted defendant's motion stat-
ing to the jury as his reasons for so ruling as follows 
(R. 133, 134) : 
"In view of the fact that you have put in 
almost a day in this matter I think you are 
entitled to some explanation why I am doing 
that. The Plaintiff, of course, as an employee of 
the Union Pacific Railroad Com'pany charges 
the Union Pacific . was negligent and if you 
will observe he was the man that was directing 
the operation of this train out on the lead arid 
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closest to these little baggage trucks strewn along 
the right-of-way. But they were left over the 
yellow line by the employees of the Denver Term-
inal Company, which the evidence shows is a 
separate company from the Union Pacific and 
there is no tie-in between the Union Pacific and 
the Denver Terminal Company, so if there was 
negligence it was negligence, not of the Union 
Pacific Company's and its employees, but the 
Denver Terminal Company. As you have prob-
ably observed in this case nobody is to be 
charged with damages unless they have done 
something through their employee or themselves. 
Now we get to another feature of the case, as to 
whether or not Mr. Butz was the cause of his 
injuries and of course, if any one of these fea-
tures is defective of course the Plaintiff is limited 
to the granting of their motion. In all these cases 
the Plaintiff must not only show that the De-
fendant was negligent and I am at a loss to find 
how such conduct on the part of the Denver 
Terminal Company, that is the Union Pacific 
could be responsible for the conduct of the em-
ployees of the Denver Terminal Com~pany. So I 
have granted the motion and your services won't 
be ~eed~d any longer and you are now excused.'' 
STA!TEMEN'T OF POINTS 
1. The trial court erred in granting defendant's 
motion for nonsuit (R. 133, 134). 
2. The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's mo-
tion for new trial (R .. 34). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLI-
GENT (statement of Points 1 and 2). 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEG-
LIGEN·CE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS 
INJURIES (statement of Points 1 and 2) . 
. POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT WRON·GFULLY DEPRIVED PLAIN-
TIFF OF HIS RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRE-D IN HOLDING AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLI-
GENT (statement of Points 1 and 2). 
(a) Where I{JJYb employee is sent on the premises· of 
ooother to w~ork side by side with employees of :another 
and suffers injury by reason of a;n unsafe condition cre-
a.ted by the negligence of the owner -of the prem.ises or 
the owner's servants, such negligence is imputed to and 
becomes that of the emp~loyer. 
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The master's duty of exercising reasonable care in 
furnishing its employees with a safe place to work is 
__ personal to the master and nondelegable. 2. Sherman & 
Redfield on Negligence, Revised Edition, Sections 193 
and 202. The master's duty follows the servant to what-
ever place he is sent by the master to p·erform the duties 
of his employment even though that place is upon prop-
erty owned hv another and over which the master has no 
control Porter v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 327 
Ill. App. 645, 65 N.E. 2d 31; Ryan v. Tw'in C~ty Wholesale 
G.rocer Co. a;nd; Minn. T'IYlJnSfer Ry. Co., 210 Minn. 21, 
297 N.W. 705; Wegman v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 189 
Minn. 325, 249 N.W. 422; Albert Miller & Co·. v. Wilkins, 
209 Fed. 582, at page 584; Harding v. R:ailway Trwnsfer 
Co., 83 N.W. 395; St-eller v. ·C. & N. W. Ry .. Co., 46 W~s·. 
497, 1 N.W.112, 49 Wis. 609,6 N.W. 303. 
Albert Miller & ·Co. v. Wilkins, 209 Fed. 582, 584 
(7th Cir. 1913). 
''That a master is bound to use reasonable 
care to provide a safe place in which his servant 
may work is now too well established to require 
citation of authority, and it can make no differ-
ence, so far as the servant is concerned, whether 
the master is using his own property or that of 
another.'' 
In .the case at bar plaintiff was injured as a direct 
result of a dangerous :condition created by leaving bag-
gage trucks in a danger zone upon the baggage platform. 
Defendant's duty toward plaintiff was continuing. 
Plaintiff had no choice either over the 'Place where he 
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was to 'vork or the "\Vorkmen "\vith 'vhom he was required 
to ,v·ork. ''T e submit under the authorities, which will be 
hereinafter cited, that the defendant railroad company 
is chargeable 'vith and responsible for the unsafe con-
dition of the prentises, and also for negligence which it 
could reasonably anticipate on the part of emp~loyees of 
the D·enver Union Terminal Company, which caused 
plaintiff's injuries. 
In Porter v Terminal R . .Ass'n, supra, an action 
brought under the Federal Employers-' Liability Act, 
the employer was held responsible for the unsafe condi-
tion of the premises of a third person and over which it 
had no control when its employee, in the course of his 
employment, was injured while upon said premises, 
as a result of their unsafe condition. An engine 
plaintiff was riding struck a derailer - causing the 
engine to be derailed. The derailer was rendered ~~ar­
tially invisible by weeds which had been allowed to grow 
in the vicinity. 
"It is conceded by defendant, and the evi-
dence is undisputed, that plaintiff was an em-
ployee of defendant at the time of the accident. 
The statute under which suit is brought provides 
in substance : 'Every common carrier by railroad 
while engaging in (interstate) commerce * * * 
shall be liable in damages to any person suffering 
injury while he is employed by such carrier in 
such commerce * * * resulting in whole or in 
part from the negligence of any of the officers, 
agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason 
of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negli-
gence, in its cars,- engines, ap·pliances, machinery, 
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track, roadbed * * * or other equipment.' 45 
U.S.C.A. Sec. 51. It is the duty of the Master 
to furnish the servant with a reasonably safe 
place to work. ·This duty also applies to machin-
ery and instrumentalities used by the servant 
in his work; and this duty follows the Master even 
though the servant is sent upon the premises of 
another to do his work. !This duty is non-deleg-
able and affirmative, and must be continuously _ 
fulfilled and positively performed.'' 
(Citing many sui)porting authorities including W egmam 
v. Grea,t Northern Ry. Co.,· supr-a, and Ryan v. Twin 
City Wholesale Grocer Co., and Minn. Transfer Ry. Co., 
supra, which will be hereinafter set forth in detail). 
- Ryan v. Twin ·City Wholesale Grocer Co. et ol., 297 
N.W. 705 (Minn. 1941). Action for pe~sonal injuries 
sustained by plaintiff while working for the defendant 
railroad company on the premises of a grocery company 
as a checker. Sacks of sugar had been piled in the gro-
cery company's building by its employees. While plain-
tiff was removing a sack of s~gar, hecause of negligent 
piling of the sacks, other sacks fell, injuring him. It was 
contended that the railroad company was not respon-
sible for the negligence of grocery comp~any employees 
in stacking the sugar. 'The court supported a verdict 
for the plaintiff and, discussing the absolute and non-
delegable duty of a master to furnish its servants 
a reasonably safe ~place to work, stated: 
"It is true that appellant had had nothing 
to do with piling of the hags which fell and 
caused plaintiff's injuries. That was the work 
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of the grocery con1pany alone. However, the 
court e harged the jury : 'You are instructed that 
for the purposes of this lawsuit · the Railway 
Company would be liable for the consequences of 
any negligent piling of the sacks of sugar by the 
employees of the grocery eompany in the same 
manner as if the piling had been done by the 
employees of the railway con1pany in the ordinary 
course of its business.' Error is assigned upon 
this instruction. The instruction was correct on 
the theory that plaintiff as appellant's servant 
\vas entitled to a reasonably safe place wherein 
to work. The grocery com,pany's building was the 
one plaee wherein appellant directed plaintiff to 
do all his work. Hence, its duty was to use ordi-
nary care to see that it was a reasonably safe 
place for that purpose. The court so instructed: 
'It was the duty of the railway company under 
the law to exercise ordinary care and caution not 
to put Ryan to work in a place of danger or sub-
ject him to hazards or risks unknown to him or 
not appreciated by him.' In view of the situation, 
·appellant mt~;.st ~assume responsibi~ity if the sacks 
of sugar were piled so negligently .as to endanger 
its s-ervants who were required to w·ork in prox-
imity thereto.'' 
It will be observed that in the Ryan ease the negli-
gence of the grocery company's employees became and 
was the negligence of the railroad com1pany. It was not 
negligence in failing to discover the improperly stacked 
sacks of sugar, but negligence in the st·ackirn.g itself for 
which liability attached. 
This case cannot on any conceivable principle be 
distinguished from the case at bar. 
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Wegm·wn v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 249 N.W. 422, 
423 ( S. Ct. Minn. June 23, 1933). Action for personal 
injuries suffered by railroad employee while on the 
premises of a telephone company as a result of negli-
gence ~f the telephone company's employee resulting 
in a collision between a motor truck and a motorcar and 
trailer at a railroad crossing. It was contended that the 
railroad company was not responsible for the neglect 
of the telephone company's employee. The court held 
. that the railroad com'P~any was responsible under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act, and stated: 
''The next question is whether, if at all, 
defendant can be charged 'Yi.th the negligence of 
Latterall, the member of the telephone company's 
crew whose negligen~e the jury has found, on 
sufficient evidence, was the cause of plaintiff's 
injury. Doubtless Latterall was a servant of the 
telephone company. But that, under the circum-
stances, is no bar to charging defendant with his 
negligence. While the operation was ultimately in 
the interest of the telephone company, it was 
nevertheless a railroad operation, one of rail 
transportation, to the extent that the motorcar 
and trailer were using the tracks of defendant. 
They were so using it at the time of injury, and 
their use resulted in the accident. From such a 
railroad op~eration and such results, ·a railrooo 
compaJY141 oam;not ·div-o"fice itself by contract. The 
lrmo imposes ,a duty wh~c'h is nondelegable, lfUI1ii 
an oblig•ation whiC'h cannot be so esoap:ed. That 
has been held iln cases of outright and complete 
le,ase. '' 
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It will again be observed that the railroad company 
is positively and unequivocally charged with respon-
sibility for the n.egligent acts of a.n employee of a.nother 
company 01)er which it had no direct me_an.s of control. 
In McElroy r. Nashua & L. R. Corp., 4 Cush. 400, 
50 Am. Dec. 794, 9 Am. Neg. Cas. 451, there was a con-
nection by the defendant railroad with another railroad. 
The injury was occasioned by the negligent operation of 
a switch on defendant's railroad, making such conneC'-
tion, by ·a servant of the other railroad. The switch itself 
was also provided by the latter. The defendant was held 
liable for the negligence of the servant whose duty it was 
to operate the switches. Chief Justice Shaw, in deliver-
ing the opinion of the court, said : 
. 
''The switch in question, in the careless or 
negligent management of which the damage oc-
curred, was a part of the defendant's road; * * * 
and although , provided for and attended by a 
servant of the Concord Railroad Col"1p'oration, and 
at their expense, yet it was still a part of the 
Nashua & Lowell Railroad (the defendant) and it 
was within the scope of their duty (the defen-
dant's) to see that the switch was rightly con-
structed, attended, and managed.'' 
Lovett v. c.allow,ay, 69 Fed. Supp. 532 (Ga. 1946). 
In this case the court held that where an employee of a 
railroad company was kille·d while employed in the 
employer's yard by an engine of another carrier which 
was negligently operated by an employee of su.ch other 
carrier, the employee of the carrier whose act caused 
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employee's death was an employee of defendant em-
ployer within the terms of the Federal Employers' 
Lia hili ty Act. 
It will be observed that in the Lovett case, as in 
many of the cases eited, the negligence was an affirmative 
act on the pa'!t of the servant of another company for 
which the employer railroad company was held respon-
sible. This case is also undistinguishable from the case 
at ha·r. 
In the case of Ellis v. Union Pacific R. Co., 22 N.W. 
2d 305 (Nebr. 1946) the following fact situation ap-
peared: Plaintiff, an engine foreman in charge of a 
switching crew, sought recovery for personal injuries 
received by him in a narrow clearance between a· box-
car in defendant's service and the building of another 
be,eause of alleged negligence of defendant, among other 
things, in failing to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe 
place in which to work. The Supreme Court of the :State 
of Nebraska reversed and set aside a jury verdict for 
the plaintiff, stating: 
''Under such circumstances the failure of 
defendant to have· engineers professionally re-
design its system of tracks and move them farther 
west after construction of the Casein Building 
over which it had no control was not negligence." 
The court distinguished numerous cases on the 
ground that the building which constituted the impaired 
clearance was on the premises and belonged to a third 
party over whieh defendant exercise· no control. This 
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case was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United 
States and the decision is reported in 67 8. Ct .. 598, 329 
U.S. 654, decided February 3, 1947. The Supreme Court 
of the. United States .rejected the contentions of defen-
dant and reiterated the time honored and well-esta-
blished principle of law that the duty of a master to 
exercise reasonable care in furnishing a servant with a 
safe place in which to perform his work is absolute and 
nondelegable and follows the servant wherever lie may 
go in the legitimate performance of the duties . of his 
employment. 
The Supreme Court of the United States clearly 
held that the location of the building creating the unsafe 
condition could well be a basis for liability. That court 
stated: 
'' * * * Petitioner was unfamiliar with the 
area and its hazards; if there w_as a sign warning 
of the danger, he did_-not see it; no effort was 
made to warn him personally. The nearness of 
the track t'o the building created an wn.sa~fe place 
for work.-
* * * * 
''The choice of conflicting versions of the 
way the accident happened, the decision as to 
which witness was telling the truth, the inferences 
to be- drawn from uncontroverted as well as con-
troverted facts, are questions for the jury. Ten-
nant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 
S. Ct. 409, 88 L.. Ed. 520; Lavender v. Kurn, 
supra. O·nce there is a reasonable basis in the 
record for concluding that there was negligence 
which caused the injury, it is irrevelant that fair-
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minded men might reach a different conclusion. 
For then it would be an invasion of the jury's 
function for an appellate court to draw contrary 
inferences or to conclude that a different con-
clusion would be more reasonable. Lavender v. 
Kurn, supra, 327 U.;S·. at page 652, 66 S. Ct. at 
page 7 43. And where, as here, the case turns on 
controverted facts and the credibility of witnes-
ses, the case is peculiarly one for the jury. Wash-
ington & Georgetown R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U.S. 
554, 572, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 1049, 34 L. Ed. 235; Tiller 
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 .U.S. 54, 68, 
63 S. Ct. 444, 451, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 
967." 
Schlueter v. Ea.st St. Louis Connecting Ry. ·Co·., 296 
S.W. 105,112 (S. Ct. of Mo.1927). It appeared that the 
plaintiff was injured while in the performance of his 
duties as a switchman by derailment of the engine tender 
while riding on the footboard of said engine over the 
tracks of another company. It was contended that 
inasmuch as defendant had no ·control or authority 
to control the tracks and yard belonging to another 
company it was not responsible for plaintiff's injuries. 
The court, in rejectin_g this contention and holding for 
the plaintiff, stated: 
''It is argued that the evidence shows that 
neither appellant nor its trainmaster ha'd control 
or sup~ervision of the Dupo switchyard, which was 
owned, operated and maintained by the Missouri 
Pacifi.c Railroad Comp·any; hence it is claimed 
that the status of appellant's trainmaster was no 
more than that of a mere licensee. However, 
app·ellant's trainmaster testified quite ·positively 
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that his duties 'vere to supervise the appellant's 
switching cre"'"S 'vhile in the Dupo yard, 'to get 
the crews out of there,' and to 'tell them what 
tracks to get in on to relieve the other part of the 
yard.' Acting w·ithin the scope of such duties and 
employment, the evidence shows that the train-
master directed respondent, and the switching 
crew of which he was a member, to use track No. 
1 so that it seems to be clear that appellant re-
tained the direction and control of the work of the 
s'vitching crew in using the switchyard of the Mis-
souri Pacific Railroad Company, an·d track No. 1 
in said yard. It ha,.s been ruled by this eourt, and 
by the courts of other jurisdictions, as well, that a 
railro·ad company w·hich runs its engines and 
tfiains .aver the t'"'acks -owned by ~anothe.r compan.y 
is bottnd to know and to see that those track.s are 
in a reasonably safe condition for use by its own 
employees. 
''In Ford v. Dickinson, Receiver, 280 Mo. 206, 
loc. cit. 225, 217 S.W. 294, 300, it app,ears from the 
statements of facts that a switchman, employed ' 
by the ·defendant receiver of the railway company, 
was injured while using a track situated upon the 
premises of a milling company, by reason of com-
ing in contact with a post erected and maintained 
by the milling company in close proximity to such 
track. In that case, Judge Ragland (then commis-
sioner), speaking for this division of this court, 
said: 
'' 'If the track was negligently maintained 
dangerously near the post the receiver {of the 
railway company) is liable. The master is hound 
to exercise ordinary .care to make the place where 
his employees work. reasonably safe, and where 
he contracts to do the work on the p·ermises of 
another, and retain direction an·d control of the 
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work, the general ·rule applies, and he must ex-
ercise the same care for the safety of his employ-
ees that the law imposes on him on his own 
rp~remises. Clark v. Foundry Co., 234 Mo. 436, 
loc. cit. 454 (137 S.W. 577, 45 L.R.A. (N.'S·.) 295); 
Penn. Steel Co. v. Nace, 113 Md. 460 (77 A. 1121, 
45 L.R.A. (N.S.) 281). Defendant receiver was 
not required by law to operate the switch tracks 
in the millyard under conditions dangerous to his 
employees, if it was practicable and feasible for 
such dangerous ·conditions to be removed. If he 
had no such control that he cou~d hav-e removed 
such conditions himself, he could have required 
the milling company to ha.ve ·done so, or refused, 
until such change, to do its switching. Devine 
v. Delano, 272 Ill. 166 ( 111 N.E. 7 42, · Ann. Cas. 
1918A, 689).' 
''In Kanawha & Michigan Railway Co. v. 
Kerse, 239 U.S. 576, 36 S. Ct. 174, 60 L. Ed. 448, 
an action under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act (U. S. Comp. St. Sees. 8657-8665), a brake-
man was injured upon the premises of a brewing 
company by coming in contact with a timber, 
erected by the brewing company over its private 
switch track at a height of approximately 311! 
feet above the top· of a boxcar . upon which the 
em'P'loyee was standing in the performance of 
his duties. Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the 
federal Supreme Court, said : 
_ '' 'The action of the railway company, 
through its employees, in condu~ting its switch-
ing operations upon. a switch obstructed, as this 
one was, in such manner as to endanger the 
lives of brakemen upon its cars, sp·eaks so clearly 
of negligence that no time need be spent upon 
it. The evidence that the timber had been in 
the position described for a considerable period 
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of time was presumptive evidence of notice to 
the company; besides which the switch engineer 
and conductor both testified to actual knowledge 
on their part, prior to the time of the accident 
to Barry.' 
* * * * 
''In Doyle v. Railway Co., 127 Mic.h. 94, loc. 
cit. 98, 86 N.W. 524, 526 (54 L.R.A. 461, 89 Am. 
·St. Rep. 456), that court has said: 
" 'The rule is established by the v1eight of 
authority that, when a railroad company runs 
its trains over the tracks owned by another, the 
_company is bound to see that the tracks are in a 
safe condition (citing authorities).' 
''In Stetler v. Railway Co., 46 Wis. 497, loc. 
cit. 502, 1 N.W. 112, 114, it is said: 
'' 'The authorities are quite uniform, that 
where one railroad company uses the track of 
another company for the purpose of transporting 
passengers or property, the company transport-
ing the persons or property is liable for an;y 
damages which may be sustained, either by the 
passengers or by the owners of the property so 
transported, caused by any defects in the road 
of the other company so used, or by the negli-
gence of the servants or employees of such other 
comp'any occurring ·during such trransport.atvon. 
* * * We are also of the opinion that the same 
rule should apply as between the railroad com-
pany and its employees. * * * As between itself 
and its employees, who were directed to use the 
road in the business of the defendant comp·a.ny, 
such employees have the right to treat the road 
as the company's road, and the compawy as to 
its employees was bound to see that such road, 
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whilst so used for its benefit by its employees, 
wa.s in such cond.ition as not to 111nnecessarily 
endanger their lives o-r limbs.' 
''In Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. v. Ross, 
142 Ill. 9, loc. cit. 14, 31 N.E. 412, 413 (34 Am~ 
St. R·ep. 49), the deceased, a switchman in appel-
lant's employ, was killed by the derailment of a 
car on which deceased was riding, while the car 
was heing transferred to a defective switch track 
of another railroad company. Said that court: 
" 'It is claimed that the appellant is not 
liable because the defective tracks did not belong 
either to the ap~pellal}.t, or to the Wisconsin 
Central Line. But the following propositions are 
well established both by reason and authority: 
A railroad company is responsible for accidents 
caused by defective tracks; it is bound to exer-
cise due care to safely carry the passengers and 
property intrusted to it; it is therefore, its duty 
to see to it that the road, which it uses for such 
transportation, is safe and in good repair, whether 
such road is owned by it or not; if it uses the 
track of another company for such purpose, it 
is liable for damages to its passengers or freight 
by reason of defects in the road of such other 
comp·any so used by it; this rule applies as 
between the railroad company and its. employees. 
There is no evidence that the deceased had any 
knowledge of the defects in the track. Where 
the employee of a railroad com'pany is directed 
to use the road of another company in the busi-
ness of his employer, he has the right to treat 
such road as th'e road of the company employing 
him; ·and every railroad c·omp,wny, w·ho1SB emr 
p·loyees use the road of another comp.any under 
its direction or for its benefit, ·ow:es it as a duty 
to such empZovyees to see that such ro·ad is not 
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in a. condition which wi.ll unnecessa,rily endange.r 
their lives or limbs.' '' 
In Sal.zberg v. Grossnzan Nass1au Hotel Corpo~ation, 
16 N.Y.S. 2d 811, 258 App,ellate Div. 926, the court 
supported a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant and stated: 
''The defendant may not escape liability 
because of its failure to furnish a safe place to 
work by asserting that the particular part of its 
premises 'vhere the accident happened was not 
within its control, since it employed the plain-
tiff to render services for it and directed her 
to work in that portion of the premises. The 
fact that such part of the premises was other-
wise within the control of another individual is 
immaterial. The defendant saw fit to require 
plaintiff to work in that particular place and 
under the evidence that particular place was not 
a safe place to work.'' 
The principle .contended for by pl~ntiff herein is 
set forth clearly and succinctly in Termin:al R. Ass'n of 
St. Louis v. Fitzjohn, 165 F. 2d 473, 476 (8th Cir. 1948). 
It a~ppeared in that case that the plaintiff, while working 
for the defendant railroad company, was sent in the 
performance of his duties as a foreman upon the .prop-
erty of the United States Government at an Ordinance 
Plant near St. Louis, Missouri, and that while riding 
the side of a car along a loading ramp, was knocked 
from the car by certain iron pipes and standards extend-
ing from the ramp·. It was contended vigorously hy the 
defendant that because the railroad company did not 
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own or 1n any manner or way whatsoever control or 
have the right of control of the ramp and the'conditions 
attendant thereto or the tr~cks, along which plaintiff 
was riding, that the railroad company was not respon-
sible. The court supported a judgment for the plaintiff 
in the following language: 
"Since plaintiff was an employee of defen-
dant at the· time of his injury the fact that the 
1premises where plaintiff was sent to work did 
not belong to and we·re not under the control 
of defendant did not absolve defendant from 
liability for their unsafe condition. In Albert 
Miller & Co. v. Wilkins, 7 Cir., 209 F. 582, 584, 
the Court stated the rule in the following lan-
guage: · 
'' ' That a master is bound to use reasonable 
care to provide a safe place in which his servant 
may work is now too well established to require 
citation of authority, and it can make no differ-
ence, so far as the servant is concerned, whether 
the master is using his own property or that of 
another. As was said in American Machinery 
Co. v. Ferry, 141 Ky. (372), page 374, 132 S.W. 
(546), page 547: 
'' 'The master who contracts to do work on 
the premises of another must exe~cise ordinary 
care for the. safety of his servants there, no 
less than on his own p·remises.' 
''See also Labatt, Master & Servant. (2d Ed.), 
Vol. 3, Chap. XL:V, Sec. 1073, p·p. 2835-2836, 
Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Tennant, 1 Cir., 66 F. 
922. '' 
In Flao·dy v. Great N oll"the'ln Ry. Go., et ~al., 102 
Minn. 81, 112 N.W. 875 plaintiff was a switchman in the 
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employ of defendant, the Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis 
& Omaha Rail\Yay Company. It a·ppeared from the evi-
dence that plaintiff's employer and the Great Northern 
Railway Company jointly used a certain switch over 
which both rail,vay companies operated and moved their 
trains. \\Thile plaintiff was riding on the train of his 
employer in the discharge of his duties, the Great North-
ern Company, by and through its employees, carelessly 
and negligently failed to operate the switch, as a result 
of which the train upon which plaintiff was riding was 
derailed. The tracks over which the train was operating 
were under the control and being operated by the Union 
Depot Company. However, plaintiff's employer had the 
right and privilege· of using the tracks and switches by 
virtue of a private contract. The court stated: 
"* * * The fact that the switch was imperfect 
(if it was) does not relieve the Omaha Company 
from the duty which it owed to plaintiff upon 
the occasion of his injury. As we understand 
the law, whether the engine was derailed by 
reason of the defective switch, or on account of 
the negligence of the switch tender in operating 
it, that company is liable for the result. It is 
not important whether the switch was operated 
by the employees ·of the Union Depot Comp·any, 
as a part of their regular duties, or whether they 
operated this particular switch without the spe ... 
cial authority of the Union Depot Company, and 
for the accommodation of defendant companies. 
We a.re satisfied that, as betw·een the Omaha 
Cornparny and the pl·aintiff, the company accepted 
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the serv~ices of the switchman on that particular 
occasion to the sa.me extent as though he had 
been in its emp·loy. * * * 
'' * * * The Omaha Comtpany owed the duty 
to plaintiff to use all reasonable diligence to 
carry him safely in its engine out of the depot 
yards, and it was immaterial to plaintiff whether 
in so doing defendant op·erated its trains over 
its own tracks and switches, over the tracks and 
switches which it had leased from another com-
pany, or under a contract with the Union Depot 
Company. It was immaterial to plaintiff that 
the switchmen were paid by the Union Depot 
Company, and were under its control in oper-
ating the switches, if, for the occasion, the Omaha 
Company chose to avail itself of the services of 
that company for its employees for the purpose 
of taking its train out of the depot.'' 
For other cases holding_ fast to the general prin-
ci'P~les of law contended for by the plaintiff herein, see: 
Rose v. Missouri D·ist. Telegtf,aph Co. and Rose v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co. arnd Rose v. Union Electric Light 
& Power ,Co., 43 S. W. 2d 5·62, 328 Mo. 1009; Burke v. 
Boston & M. R. R. Co., 134 Atl. 574, (N.H. 1926); 
Brock v. Ireland-Grafton Co., 141 Atl. 912 (N.H. 1928); 
F<Jntenot v. R~aftery, 193 !So. 896 (L~a. 1940); RehOJrd v. 
Miles, .et ·al., 284 N. W. 829 (Ia. 193.9) ; Ta'!Jlo·r v. J. A. 
Jones ·Oonst. ·Go. et al., 195 N. Car. 30, 141 S. E. 492 
'(1928); B·art;o v. low1a Tel. Go., 12H Ia. 241, 101 N. W. 
876, 106· Am. St. Rep·. 347; Miner v. Franklin ·County Tel. 
Go., 83 Vt. 311, 75 Atl. 653, 26 L .. R.A. (N.S.) 119·5; 
Barnes v. Red River & G. R. R., 128 So. 724 (La. 1930). 
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If the railroad company sends its employees upon 
the premises of ·another to work where an unsafe and 
hazardous condition exists and injury or death results, 
its responsibility therefor is hardly possible of dispute. 
This is true because the employer exclusively exercises 
the choice as to where the employee is to petform his 
work and has the exclusive duty, authority and ability 
to c.ontrol and supervise all . safety factors at the place 
of work. The same reason for the rule as to place of 
work exists where the employer sends his employees 
to a place where they are required to work daily and 
customarily side by side with employees of other com-
panies. Such condition exists throughout the railroad 
system wherever the carrier delivers goods to ultimate 
consignees and also wherever terminal stations· are used 
to transfer goo.ds and p·assengers from one railroad 
company to another. In all of these places employees 
of the railroad company are required to perform the 
work of loading and unloading, delivering and receiving 
in conjunction with and while working alongside em-
ployees of other companies. The railroad companies 
under such circumstances have control over all safety 
factors, rules and regulations regarding the -work of 
said employees. As a condition to sending. their employ-
ees upon such premises and as a condition to requiring 
their employees to work alongside the employees of 
such consignees or terminal companies, railroad com-
panies may impose any rules, regulations or require-
ments which they desire. On the other hand the em-
ployee has no means of control by regulation or other- . 
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wise over the activities, !conduct or manner of working 
of em1ployees of the other company. Under such cir-
cumstances it seems inconceivable that real or substan-
tial distinction would or could he drawn between respon-
sibility of the railroad company for unsafe static con-
ditions on the premises of another and responsibility 
for the active neglect of employees of another alongside 
whom such company requires. its employees to work and 
to perform the duties of their employment. 
Furthermore, the work of loading and unloading 
cars which make up interstate trains, regardless of who 
does the work, is that of the railroad company. The 
railroad cannot divorce itself from responsibility ·for 
the manner in which such work is done merely by virtue 
of the fact that it does not pay. the wages· of such em-
ployees or exercise direct supervisory control over them. 
Of interest in this connection are cases where the ex-
istence of the employer-employee relationship is in dis-
p·ute. Such a case is that of Jones v. George F. Getty Oil 
Co., 92 F. 2d 255, 259, 263 (10 C.C.A.). In that ca~e plain-
tiff was employed by one Norwood in Texas to work on 
certain oil drilling operations in New Mexico. The water 
for this operation was to be furnished to Norwood by 
the defendant. This water was to come from certain 
wells on defendant's prop·erty. The wells came out of 
repair· and Norwood was prevented from continuing 
his drilling operations because there ~as no other avail-
able source for o_btaining water. Plaintiff, under the 
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direction of Norwood's foreman, went to the property 
of the defendant to assist in repairing the wells. This 
foreman directed plaintiff to climb a ''gin pole,'' attach 
a block to the top thereof and feed a pulley through the 
block. Plaintiff was standing near the top of the pole, 
pursuant to the aforesaid order, when a guy wire broke 
allowing the pole to fall, injuring him. 
In the performance of this work upon the premises 
of the defendant the plaintiff was acting under the 
direction, supervision an·d control of Norwood and Nor-
wood's foreman. Plaintiff was not -at-any time or in any 
manner acting under the direction, supervision or con-
trol of the defendant or any of its. employees. Plaintiff 
accepted compensation under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion laws from Norwood and this suit was brought 
against the defendant on the theory that he was a negli-
gent third party. The court held that plaintiff was a 
special employee of the defendant and hence his only 
remedy was under the New Mexico Compensation Act. 
The court stated: 
''The controlling factor is: For whom is the 
work being performed, and who had the power 
to control the work and the employee? The au-
thority to determine the work to he done, and 
the m-anner in which it is to be carried on, neces-
sarily includes the right to suspend or terminate 
the work altogether or, possibly, to exclude the 
particular emiployee from the job, not including 
the right to discharge the employee from the 
service of his general employer (Norwood), nor 
need it include the actual giving of directions to 
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the employee in connection with the work he is 
doing. 
'' Bill Wood, the foreman, and plaintiff, and 
the other members, of Norwood's crew, had volun-
tarily entered upon said premises in said work 
with the consent of said defendant, who was the 
owner and in control, through his lease superin-
tendent, Allen Stewart. 
* * * * 
''The ultimate test is: Whose is the work 
being done~ Standard Oil Company v. Anderson, 
supra. In determining whose work is· being done, 
the question of the power to control the work 
is of great importance (Standard Oil Company 
v. Anderson, supra), hut is not conclusive (Lin-
stead v. C. & 0. R. Co.; Hull v. Philadelphia & 
R. R. Co. supra). The identity of the person who, 
in fact, directs the details of the work and gives 
the immediate instructions to the workmen is of 
comparatively small importance, the power of 
control referred to being the power to control 
the undertaking as a whole. McLamb v. DuPont 
Company, supra; Singer Mfg. Co. v~ Rahn, 
supra.'' 
See also Linstead v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. !Co., 276 U.S. 
28, 48 S. Ct. 241, 72 L.. Ed. 453; Standard Oil Co. v. 
Anderson, 212· U.S. 215, 29 S. Ct. 252, 53 L. Ed. 480; 
F·arw·ell v. Boston & Worcester R. R. :Corp., 4 J\Ietc. 49, 
38 Am. De.c. 339; Denton v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 284 
u.s. 305, 52 s.· ct. 141. 
In the case at bar it is cle·ar that the terminal 
company in loading and unloadin_g cars which made up 
defendant's trains was performin_g the work of the rail-
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road company and that the railroad company was there-
fore responsible for the manner in which that work was 
being performed. 
It is likewise clear that the defendant chose to rely 
upon the terminal company employees in performing the 
work of keeping and maintaining a track clear of bag-
gag-e truck obstructions. When defendant made this 
decision, it assumed responsibility for the manner in 
which the work of terminal company employees was 
performed. 
(b) Whether the defendant furnished pla.intiff a 
reasonably safe place to work was a question of fact 
for the jwry. 
Plaintiff alleged that defendant railroad company, 
knowing that switchmen and other of defendant's em-
ployees ,customarily rode engines and cars in a westerly 
direction along the outside baggage track and p:ast the 
baggage platform, nevertheless negligently left impaired 
clearance between cars passing on said track and ten 
baggage trucks which had been left along the bag-
gage platform. The evidence abundantly supported 
plaintiff's allegation. The ten haggage trucks, located 
parallel to the track along the baggage platform, had 
been placed and left between the yellow danger line 
and the south edge of the iplatform. Furthermore, the 
easternmost of said tracks was left approximately ten 
feet from the eastern end of the platform, leaving little, 
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if any, space within which plaintiff could dismount from 
his position on the point car as it moved in a westerly 
direction. 
Uncontroverted evidence revealed that' plaintiff and 
his crew rode the sides of cars past baggage trucks 
located on the platform as often as six times a day on 
some days, and that employees of other railroads did 
likewise ( R. 49). 
It is true that the Denver Union Terminal Company 
employees handled and used the baggage trucks, leaving 
the inference that such employees in all probability were 
responsible for leaving the trucks in the danger zone 
as heretofore indicated. We submit, however, that under 
the foregoing facts a jury could well find that defendant 
had violated its. continuing and non-delegable duty of 
furnishing plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which 
to work. 
In determining whether the place where plaintiff 
was working was safe, all safety 'precautions, if any, 
taken by the defendant and also all precautions which 
might h·ave been taken -must be considered and "All 
inferences which reasonably may be drawn from the 
evidence must be determined in plaintiff's favor, * * *" 
Thomson v. Boles, 123 F. 2d 487. 
In B~ai'ley v. Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 319 U.S. 
350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 1064, 87 L. Ed. 1444, the court said: 
''The nature of the task which Bailey under-
took, the hazards which it entailed, the effort 
which it required, the kind of footing he had, 
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the space in which he could stand, the absence 
of a guard rail, the height of the bridge above 
the ground, the fact that the car could have been 
opened or unloaded near the bridge on level 
ground-all these were facts and circumstances 
for the jury to weigh and appraise in determining 
\\'"hether respondent in furnishing Bailey with 
that particular place in which to perform the 
task was negligent.'' 
In the case of Boston & M.R.R. v. Meech, 156 F. 2d 
109, 111, ( 1 C.C.A. Cer. den. Oct. 28, 1946, 6·7 S. Ct. 124) 
the deceased was performing the job of strip·ping en-
gines. He was working on a structure just outside the 
engine house known as the washstand, which consisted 
of two parallel wooden platforms. At the time of his 
death he was standing near the northerly edge of the 
southe.rly platform in the path of but oblivious to the 
approach of the locomotive which killed him. The case 
was tried on two counts, the first being negligent opera-
tion of the locomotive, and the second being failure to 
provide a reasonably safe place in which to work. The 
court said: 
''The sufficiency of the evidence to support 
the verdict on the second count is at least equally 
clear. The defendant might have painted lines 
on the platforms of its washstan·d to indicate 
the extent to which locomotives overhang them, 
and thus to warn persons on the platforms of 
the danger incident to standing near their inner 
borders, or it might even have set the platforms 
of its washstand back from the tracks far enough 
to prevent locomotives from overhanging them 
at all. 
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''From the foregoing, it is clear that although 
some precautions were taken for the decedent's 
safety, further p,recautions were possible, and 
from this it follows, as we read the decisions 
cited above, that there was an 'evidentiary basis' 
for submitting the issue of the defendant's 
causal negligence to the jury, and hence that 
our 'function is exhausted.' Lavender v. Kurn 
et al., supra, ( 66 S. Ct. 7 44). Also we think it 
evident from what we have said that although 
the decedent eould readily have taken more care 
than he did for his own safety either by standing 
hack from the edge of the platform, or by watch-
ing more closely for locomotives coming in from 
the yard, or by standing on the northerly platform 
upon which his presence would normally be anti-
cipated and where he would be in the hostler's 
range of vision from the engineer's seat, still we 
cannot say that as a matter of law his careless-
ness was the sole 'proximate -cause of the acci-
dent.'' 
A recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court of 
the United 1S~tates regarding sufficiency of the evidence 
for submission of_ questions of neglect to the jury for 
determination is the case of Wilkerson v. McCarthy et 
al., 336 U.S. 53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 417, reversing the Utah 
Supreme Court, 187 P. 2d 188. In that ease the plaintiff 
was injured when he fell into a wheel pit while endeavor-
ing to cross the pit by means of a plank. This court 
supported the ruling of the trial court in directing a 
verdict for defendant upon the general ground of in-
sufficiency of the evidence to establish plain tiff's alle-
gation of neglect on the part of the railroad company 
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In failing to furnish plaintiff a reasonably safe place 
to work. 
The United States Supreme Court, speaking through 
Mr. Justice Black, in holding that the case should have 
been submitted to the jury, stated: 
''There was, as the state court pointed out, 
evidence to show that petitioner could have taken 
a slightly longer route and walked around the 
rpit, thus avoiding the use of the board. This 
fact, however, under the terms of the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, would not completely 
immunize the respondents from liability if the 
injury was 'in part' the result of respondents' 
negligence. For while petitioner's failure to use 
a safer method· of crossing might be found by the 
jury to be contributory negligence, the Act pro-
vides that 'contributory negligence shall not bar 
a recovery, but the damages shall he diminished 
'by the jury in proportion to the amount of negli-
ge~ce attributable to such employee * * *.' 
"Much of respondents' argument here is 
devoted to the proposition that the Federal Act 
does not make the railroad an absolute insurer 
against p·ersonal injury damages suffered by its 
employees.. That proposition is correct, since the 
Act imposes liability only for negligent injuries. 
Cf. Coray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520, 
69 S. Ct. 27'5. But the issue of negligence is one 
for juries to determine according to their finding 
of whether an employer's conduct measures up 
to what a reasonable and p-rudent person would 
have done under the same circumstances. And a 
jury should hold a master 'liable for injuries 
attributable to conditions un·der his control when 
they are· not such as a reasonable man ought to 
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maintain in the cir.cumstances', bearing in mind 
that 'the standard of care must be commensurate 
to the dangers of the business.' Tiller v. Atlantic 
Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67, 63 S. Ct. 444, 
451, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L·.R. 967. 
"'There are some who think that recent deci-
sions of this Court which have required sub-
mission of negligence question.s · to a jury make, 
'for all practical purposes, a railroad an insurer 
of its employees.' See individual opinion of 
Judge. Major, Griswold v. Gardner, 7 Cir., 155 
F. 2d 333, 334. But see Judge Kerner's dissent 
from this view 155 F. 2d 333, at page 337 and 
Judge Lindley's dissenting opinion 155 F. 2d 
333, at pages 337, 338. This assumption, that 
railroads -are made insurers where the issue of 
?"\ 
negligence is left to the jury, is inadmissible. 
It rests on another assumption, this one unar-
ticula.ted, that juries will invariably decide negli-
gence questions against railroads. This is con-
trary to fact, as shown for illustration by other 
Federal Employers Liability eases, Barry. v. 
Reading Co., 3 Cir., 147 F. 2d 129, certiorari 
denied, 324 U.'S·. 867, 65 S. Ct. 912, 89 L. Ed. 
1422; Benton v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 
Mo. Sup., 182 S.W. 2d 61, certiorari denied, 324 
U.S. 843, 65 S. Ct. 676, 89 L. Ed. 1405. And cf. 
Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P. 2d 649, 
certiorari dismissed for reasons stated, 323 U.S. 
673, 65 S. Ct. 126, 89 L .. Ed. 547. Moreover, this 
Court stated some sixty years a.go when consider-
ing the proper tribunal for determining questions 
of negligence : 'We see no reason, so long as the 
jury system is the law of the land -and the jury 
is made the tribunal to decide disputed questions 
of fact, why it should not decide such questions 
as these as well as others.' Jones v. East Ten-
nessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 U.S. 443, 445, 9 S. Ct. 
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118, 32 L. Ed. 478. And 1peremptory instructions 
should not be given in negligence cases 'where 
the facts are in dispute, and the evidence in rela-
tion to them is that from which fair-minded men 
may draw different inferences.' Washington & 
G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U.'S·. 554, 572, 10· S. Ct. 
1044, 1049, 34 L. Ed. 235. Such has ever since 
been the established rule for trial and appellate 
courts. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 
318 U.S. 54, 67, 68, 63 S. Ct. 444, 4·51, 452., 87 
L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L .. R. 967. Courts should not 
assume that in determining these questions of 
negligence juries will fall sh-ort of a fair p·er-
formance of their constitutional function. In 
rejecting a contention that juries could be ex-
pected to determine certain disputed questions 
on whim, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice 
Holmes, said: 'But it must be assumed th·at the 
constitutional tribunal does its duty, and finds 
facts only because they are proved.' Aikens v. 
State of Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206, 25 S. Ct. 
3, 6, 49 L. Ed. 154. 
''In reaching its conclusions as to negligence, 
a jury is frequently called upon to consider many 
sep·arate strands of circumstances, and from these 
circumstances to draw its ultim·ate conclusion 
on the issue of negligence. Here there are many 
arguments that could have been presented to the 
jury in an effort to persuade it that the railroad's 
conduct was not negligent, and many counter 
arguments which might have p·ersuaded the jury 
that the railroad was negligent. The same thing 
is true as to whether p·etitioner was guilty -of 
contributory negligence. Many of such argu-
ments were advanced by the Utah Supreme Court 
to support its finding that the tpe.titioner was 
negligent and that the railroad was not. But the 
argUments made by the State 'Supreme Court 
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are relevant and a.pprop~riate ·only for considera-
tion by the jury, the tribunal selected to pass on 
the issues. For these reasons, the trial court 
should have submitted the case to the jury, and 
it was error for the Utah Supreme Court to 
affirm its action in taking the case from the 
jury." 
In the present case it cannot he denied that the 
railroad company could have done more in the discharge 
of its duty to provide plaintiff and other of its employees 
with a reasonably safe place in which to work. If we 
assume, as we must, viewing the evidence in a light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, that the baggage t111:cks 
were located in a danger zone and that their location 
created ~ hazardous condition which contributed to 
cause plaintiff's injuries, the question arises as to whe-
ther or not an evidentiary basis ·has been established 
from which a jury could conclude that the railroad 
company was negligent. 
From the facts, what reasonable inferences could 
be drawn by a jury~ The railroad company, as a con-
dition to sending its men along the haggage track -and 
p·ast the loading platform, could have required the Den-
ver Union Terminal Company to park baggage trucks 
in the center of the p·~atform rather than along the sides. 
Being -aware of the curve in the track immediately east 
of the platform the railroad company could have re-
quired the Denver Union Terminal Company employees 
to p·a.rk baggage trucks not less than 50 feet from the 
end of the platform so that men riding the sides of cars 
along the outside baggage t:r;-a:ck would have ade-
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quate and sufficient space in which to dismount 
or stop in event clearance was insufficient. 
The railroad company could have adopted rules or 
regulations governing its switching ~rews, requiring 
them to stop cuts of cars before they reached the bag-
gage platform an·d requiring the men who customarily, 
to the knowledge of the railroad com,pany, rode the 
sides of cars past the platform, to dismount and walk 
to the platform. 
If the railroad company chose to rely wholly and 
entirely upon the Denver Union Terminal Comp~any and 
its employees to maintain the track and platform in a 
safe condition, as it apparently did in this ease, the 
railroad company assume·d responsibility for the· man-
ner in which such maintenance work was performed, 
and to that extent terminal employees b·ecame the em-
ployees of the_ defendant for which defendant was 
responsible. Many cases herein cited support this 
proposition. 
In the case of Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 
68 S. Ct. 140, 142, plaintiff's complaint allege·d that 
defendant require-d plaintiff, a 2·2-year-old female tele-
graph operator, to work alone between 11 :30 p.m. and 
7 :30 a.m. in a building situated in an isolated part of 
the railroad yards; that the defendant had reason to 
know that the yards were frequented by dangerous 
characters ; that the carrier failed to exercise reasonable 
care to light the building and surroundings or to guard 
or patrol it in any way, and that during the night an 
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outsider criminally attacked plaintiff and that she sus-
tained serious and p,ermanent injuries as a result. The 
defendant filed a motion for judgment upon the plead-
ings which was granted by the trial court. The Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's action. The 
opinion of that court is set forth in 162 F. 2d 716. The 
Supreme Court of the United States, however, reversed, 
holding that the allegations of the complaint stated a 
cause of action for th~ jury. We quote from the otpinion: 
''In support of his motion for summary judg-
ment respondent alleged, and petitioner did not 
deny, that the assailant was not an employee of 
the respondent and that the attack was criminal. 
''The district court stated, in explanation of 
its action, that there would be no causal connec-
tion 'between the injury and respondent's failure 
to light or guard the premises, and that the law 
does not permit recovery 'for the intentional or 
criminal acts' of either a fellow-employee or an 
outsider. 
''We are of the opinion that the allegations 
in the complaint, if supported by evidence, will 
warrant submission to a jury. Petitioner alleged 
in effect that respondent was aware of conditions 
which created a likelihood that a young woman 
performing the duties required of petitioner 
would suffer just such an injury as was in fact 
inflicted upon her. !That the foreseeable danger 
was from intention or criminal misconduct is 
irrelevant; respondent nonetheless had a duty to 
make reasonable provision against it. Breach of 
that duty would be negligence, and we cannot 
say as a matter of law that petitioner's injury 
did not result at least in part from such negli-
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believe, do not support the broad p·roposition 
enunciated by it, and do not cover the fact situa-
tion set forth by the pleadings in this case. 
''Certiorari is granted, and the judgment is 
reversed and the case remanded to the district 
court.'' 
In the Dillie case the person who attacked plaintiff 
was a stranger, unassociated in any way with defendant, 
and yet, because defendant could anticipate in view of 
the surrounding circumstances that such a person might 
attack plaintiff and could have taken ·additional measures 
to provide plaintiff with a safe place to. work by light-
ing the area or ~patrolling the ground, a question for 
the jury was presented. 
The reasoning of the Lillie case is even more per-
tinent to the case at bar where it can hardly be denied 
that the defendant railroad company could have taken 
additional measures in provi.ding plaintiff with a reason-
ably safe place in which to work. In either case if the 
railroad company :chose to disregard its duty or to 
allow others to iperform its duty it is nevertheless 
responsible where the place of work is thereby rendered 
unsafe. This is especially true in view of the 1939 
amendment to the Federal Employers' Liability .Act 
which abolishes the doctrine of assumption of risk in 
all of its aspects. 
We respectfully submit that whether 'defendant fur-
nished plaintiff a reasonably safe place in 'vhich to 
work was a question of fact for the jury's determination. 
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POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDIN,G AS A MAT-
TER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONTRIBUTORY NEG-
LIGENCE WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS 
INJURIES (statement of Points 1 and 2). 
It is clear from the statement made by the trial 
court to the jury following ~presentation of plaintiff's 
evidence that one of the chief grounds upon which the 
court relied in its ruling was that plaintiff was himself 
guilty of negligence which was the sole proximate cause 
of his injuries. The evidence fully revealed that plaintiff, 
in riding the sill step of the leading car past the baggage 
platform, was observing a customary, usual and well-
established practice of which the railroad company was 
well aware. He stationed himself on the leading car 
at the point for the purpose of keeping a lookout ahead 
and determining whether or not there were obstructions, 
or people upon the tracks who might be endangered by 
the movement of the cut of cars. 
Plaintiff's testimony fully revealed that hy the time 
he reached a position where he could determine that the 
baggage trucks were in a danger zone he could not dis-
mount or take any other measures to· insure his safety. 
At most, his conduct was contributory negligence. ·The 
trial court by its ruling disregarded the repeated admoni-
tions of the United States Supreme Court and resur-
rected contributory negligence as a :complete bar to 
recovery. 
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In the case of Lavender v. K urn et al., 327 U.S. 
645, 66 S. Ct. 7 40, 7 43, in an action under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act for the death of a railroad 
switch tender, there was evidence from which it could 
be inferred that a mail hook swinging from the side of 
a mail car struck the deceased. In order to so find the 
jury would have had to infer that decedent was standing 
on a raised mound of dirt which was the only place 
where he could have stood and been struck by the hang-
ing mail hook. At the trial the jury returned a verdict 
in favor of plaintiff ·and the Missouri Supreme Court 
at 189 S.W. 2d 253, reversed, holding that there was 
insufficient evidence for presentation of issues of defen-
dant's negligence to the jury. The United States 
Supreme Court reversed ·and stated: 
''It is true that there is evidence tending 
to show that it was physically and mathematically 
impossible for the hook to strike Haney. And 
there are facts from which it might reasonably 
be inferred that Haney was murdered. But such 
evidence has become irrelevant upon app-eal, there 
being a reasonable basis in the record for infer-
ring that the hook struck Haney. The jury having 
made that inference, the respondents were not 
free to relitigate the factual disp·ute in a review-
ing court. Under these circumstances it would be 
an undue invasion of the jury's historic function 
for an appellate court to weigh the conflicting 
evidence, judge. the credibility of witnesses and 
arrive at a conclusion opposite from the one 
reache'd by the jury. See Tiller v. Atlantic Coast 
Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67, 68, 63 S. Ct. 444, 
451, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967; Bailey v. 
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Central Vermont R. R. Co., 319 U.S. 350, 353, 354, 
63 S. Ct. 1062, 1064, 87 L. Ed. 1444; Tennant v. 
Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S. Ct. 
409, 412, 88 L. Ed. 520. 1S·ee also Moore, 'Recent 
Trends in Judicial Interpretation in Railroad 
Cases Under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act,' 29· Marquette L. Rev. 73. 
"It is no answer to say that the jury's ver-
dict involved speculation and conjecture. When-
ever facts are in dispute or the .evidence is such 
that fair-minded men may draw different infer-
ences, a measure of speculation and conjecture 
-is required on the part of those whose duty it is 
to settle the dispute by choosing what seems to 
them to be the most reasonable inference. Only 
when there is a complete absence of probative 
facts to support the conclusion reached does a 
reversible error appear. But where, as here, 
there is an evidentiary basis for the jury's ver-
. diet, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve 
whatever facts are inconsistent with its c·on-
-elusion. And the appellate -court's function is 
exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes 
apparent, it being immaterial that the court might 
draw a contrary inference or feel that another 
conclusion is more reasonable. 
''We are unable, therefore, ·to sanction a 
reversal of the jury's verdict against Frisco's 
trustees. Nor can we rupprove any disturbance 
in the verdict as to Illinois Central. The evidence 
-was ·uncontradicted that it was very dat·k at the 
place where Haney was wor_king and the sur-
rounding ground was high and uneven. The evi-
dence also showed that this area was entirely 
within the domination and control of Illinois 
Central ·despite the fact that the area was tech-
nieally located in a public street of thP City of 
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~Ien1phis. It was not unreasonable to conclude 
that these conditions constituted an unsafe and 
dangerous working place and that such conditions 
contributed in part to Haney's death, assuming 
that it resulted primarily from the mail hook 
striking his head. '' 
In Co.ray v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S. Ct. 
275, 277, the evidence revealed that de-cedent's death 
oceurred when a one-man flat-top motorcar crashed into 
the back end of an eighty-two car freight train on a 
main line track at a point near Lemay, Utah. The train 
unexpectedly stopped just before the crash occurred 
because the air in its brake lines escaped as a result of 
the violation of the Federal Safety Ap·pliance Act. 
Decedent was in control of the motorcar but ap,parently 
was looking in another direction and did not api)Jy the 
brakes. The trial court directed a verdict for the rail-
road company at the conclusion of the evidence and the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in an opinion set 
forth at 185 P. 2d 963, supported the trial court's ruling, 
holding that the defective appliance was not R -''legal'' 
cause of the crash and of the death of decedent. 'The 
United States Supreme Court granted plaintiff's peti-
tion for certiorari an·d reversed an·d in discussing the 
matter of causation ·stated: 
"Second. 'The Utah Supreme Court review-
ed the evidence here and held as a matter of law 
that the defective equipment did not p·roximately 
·cause or contribute to the decedent's denth. That 
court discusse·d distinctions between 'proximate 
cause' in the legal sense, deemed a sufficient 
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cause to impose liability, ·and 'cause' in the 
'philosophical sense,' deemed insufficient to im-
pose liability. It considered the sto1pping of this 
train to have been a cause of decedent's death 
in the 'philosophical sense' in that the stopping 
created 'a condition upon which the negligence 
of plaintiffs' intestate operated,' one perhaps of 
many causes 'so insignificant that no ordinary 
mind would think of them as causes.' The court 
added, however, that the stopping 'was not the 
legal cause of the result,' thereby classifying it 
as not 'a substantial, as well as actual factor in 
bringing ·about' the decedent's death. This con-
clusion was reached in part upon the reasoning 
that 'The leak in the . triple valve caused the 
train to stop, because as a s-afety device, it was 
designed to do just that.' . 
''The language selected by Congress to fix 
liability in cases of this kind is simple and direct. 
Consideration of its meaning hy the introduction 
of dialectical subtleties can serve no useful inter-
pretative puf1Pose. The statute declares that rail-
roads shall he responsible for their en1ployees' 
deaths 'resulting in whole or in part' from de-
fective appliances such as were here maintained. 
45 U.S.C. 1.S-ec. 51, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 51. And to 
make its purpose crystal clear, Congre;ss has also 
provided that 'no such employee * * * shall be 
·held to have been guilty of contributory negli-
gence in any case' where a violation of the Safety 
Appliance Act, such as the one here, 'contributed 
to the· * * * death of such employee.' 45 U.S.C. 
Sec. 53, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 53. Congress has thus 
for its own reasons imposed extraordinary safety 
obligations upon railroads ·and has commanded 
that if a breach of these obligations 'contributes 
in part to an employee's de-ath, the· railroad must 
'pay damages. These air-brakes were defective; 
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for this reason alone the train suddenly and un-
expectedly stopped; a motor track car following 
at about the same rate of sp·eed and operated 
by an employee looking in another direction 
crashed into the train; all of these circumstances 
were inseparably related to one another in time 
and space. The jury could h·ave found that de-
cedent's de·ath resulted from any or all of the· 
foregoing circumstances. '' 
The Coray case presents a striking parallel to the 
case at bar. In the Coray case decedent was himself 
the driver of the motorcar which ran into the rear end 
of the stopped train. The stop·ping of the train was a 
result of a defective safety appliance, and therefore vio-
lated the Federal Safety Appliance Act. 
In the case at har the negligence complained of is 
the leaving of baggage trucks in a danger zone. The 
problem of causation is identical in each case and the 
Supreme Court of the United States has set at rest this 
issue in the aforementioned opinion. 
The trial court has in effect revived the common 
law 'doctrines of assumption of risk and contributory 
negligence in holding that plaintiff's negligence was the 
sole proximate cause of his injuries, and has fallen into 
the error discussed in the case of Tille.r v. Atlantic Coast 
Line R. Co., 318 U.iS;. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63. S. Ct. 444, 
451, wherein the court stated: 
''The doctrine of assumption of risk cannot 
be 'abolished in toto' and still remain jn partial 
existence as the court helow suggests. The theory 
that a servant is completely barred from recovery 
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for injury resulting from his master's negligence, 
which legislatures have sought to eliminate in 
all its various forms of contributory negligence, 
the fellow servant rule, 'and assumption of risk, 
must not, contrary to the will of Congress, be 
allowed recrudescence under any other label in 
the common law lexicon***'' 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL-COURT WRONGFULLY DEPRIVED PLAIN-
TIFF OF HIS RIGHT OF TRIAL BY JURY. 
Under the controlling decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, the right of trial by jury 
under the F.E.L.A., has been jealously and zealously 
guarded. 
In the recent, and much cited case of Bailey v. 
Central Vermont Ry. Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 87 L. Ed. 1444, 
· 63 S. ·ct. 1062, 1064, the· Supreme Court of the United 
States stated: 
"The right to trial by jury is 'a basic and 
fundamental feature of our system of federal 
jurisp·rudence.' Jacob v. New York City, 315 
U.S. 752, 86 L. Ed. 1166, 62 S. Ct. 854. It is part 
and parcel of the remedy afforded railroad work-
ers under the Employers' Liability Act. R-eason-
able care and cause and effect are as elusive here 
as in other fields. But the jury has heen chosen 
as the appropriate tribunal to apply those stand-
ards to the facts of these personal injuries. That 
method of determining the liability of the car-
riers and of placing on them the cost of these 
industrial accidents may be crude, archaic, and 
expensive as compared with the more modern 
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systems of workmen's c.omp·ensation. But how-
ever inefficient and backward it may be, it is 
the system which Congress has provided. To 
deprive these workers of the benefit of a jury 
trial in close or doubtful cases is to take away 
a goodly portion of the relief which Congress 
has afforded them.'' 
In the case of Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 
752, 62 S. Ct. 854, 86 L. Ed. 1166, Mr. Justice Murphy; 
speaking for the court, stated: 
"The right of jury trial in civil cases at 
common law is a hasic. and fundamental feature 
of our system of federal jurisprudence, which 
is protected by the Seventh Amendment. A right 
so fundamental and sacred to the citizen, whether 
guaranteed by the c.onstitution or provided by 
statute, should be jealously guarded by the 
courts.'' 
In speaking of this rule the United :states Supreme 
Court in the case of Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Lime R. Co., 
318 U.S. 54, 87 L. Ed. 610, 63 S. Ct. 444, 451, stated: 
'' * * * Many years ago this Court said of the 
'P'roblems of negligence, 'We see no reason, so 
long as the jury system is the law of the land, 
and the jury is made the tribunal to decide dis-
puted questions of fact, why it should not decide 
such questions as these as well as others. ' Jones 
v. East Tennessee, etc., R. Co., 128 U.S. 443, 445, 
9 S. Ct. 118, 32 L.. Ed. 478. Or as we have put it 
on another occasion, 'Where the facts are in 
dispute, and the evidence in relation to them is 
that from which fair-minded men may draw dif-
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ferent inferences', the case should go to the 
jury. so" 
F oo1tnote 30 : "Washington, etc.,· R. Co. v. 
McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 572, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 1049, 
1050, 34 L. Ed. 235. See, also, Kane v. North 
Cent. R. Co., 128 U.S. 91, 95, 96, 9 S. Ct. 16, 17, 
18, 32 L. Ed. 339; Hough v. Texas & Pac. Co., 
supra, 100 U.S. 225, 25 L. Ed. 612; Jacob v. 
City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 757, 62 :s. Ct. 
854, 856, 86 L. Ed. 1166. It appears to be the 
clear Congressional intent that, to the maximum 
extent proper, questions in actions arising under 
t~e Act should he left to the jury : * * * '' 
From the opinion in the recent case of Term.inal 
R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Schorb, 151 F. 2d 361, 365, we 
quote the following interesting language: 
'' * * * One of the main purposes of the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act was to modify 
the common law barriers against recovery by an 
employee in a suit against hi1s employer predi-
cated on an industrial aecident. Tiller, Executor, 
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 
S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L .. R. 967. ·The 
right to jury trial constitutes a part of the rem-
edy afforded by the act and employees must not 
be deprived of that right in close or doubtful 
cases. Bailey, Administratrix, v. Central V er-
mont Ry., Inc., 319· U.S. 350, loc. cit. 354, 63 S. 
Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444. It was for the jury, as 
the fact finding body, to weigh the evidence and 
judge credibility. Tennant, Administratrix, v. 
Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 
409, 88 L. Ed. 520; Crain v. Illinois Central R. 
Co., 335 Mo. 658, 73 S. W. 2d 786, certiorari denied 
293 U.S. 607, 55 '8·. Ct. 123, 79 L. Ed. 698. On 
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this app·eal we n1ust view the evidence and infer-
ences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in the-
light most favorable to plaintiff. Chic~go, St. 
P., :hi. & 0. R. Co. v. Muldowney, 8 Cir., 130 F. 
2d 971, certiorari denied, 317 U.S. 700, 63 S. Ct. 
526, 87 L. Ed. 560. '' 
In the recent case of GriswDld v. Gardner, (C.C .. A. 
7, May 15, 1946), 155 F. 2d 333, the court said: 
''Any detailed review of the evidence in a 
case of this character for the purpose of deter-
mining the prop·riety of the trial court's refusal 
to direct a verdict would be an idle and useless 
ceremony in the light of the recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court. T·his is so regardless of 
what we might think of the sufficiency of the 
evidence in this resp·ect. The fact is, so we think, 
that the Supreme Court has in effect converted 
this negligence statute into a comp·ensation law 
thereby making, for all practical purpose~s, a 
railroad an insurer of its employees. (S·ee dis-
sent of Mr. Justice Roberts in Bailey v. Central 
Vermont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 358, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 
1066, 87 L. Ed. 1444.) 
''The Supreme Court,· commencing with Til-
ler v. Atlantic Coastline R. Co., 318 . U.S. 54, 63 
:s. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967, in a 
succession of cases has reversed.every court (with 
one exception hereinafter noted) which ha;s held 
that a defendant was entitled to a directed ver-
dict. In the Tiller case, the Sup~reme Court re-
versed the Cou·rt of Appeals for the Fourth [Cir-
cuit, 128 F. 2d 420, which had affirmed the Dis-
trict Court in 'directing a verdict. The case, u~on 
remand, was again tried in the court below, where 
a directed verdict was denied. For this denial the 
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Court of Appeals reversed and again the Su-
preme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, hold-
ing that the District Court properly submitted 
the case to the jury. In Tennant v. Peoria & 
P. U. R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S. Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 
520, this court reversed the ·District Court on ac-
count of its refusal to direct a verdict, and our 
decision, 134 F. 2d 860, wa.s reversed by the Su-
preme Court. In Bailey v. Central Vermont Ry., 
319 U.S. 350, 63 S. Ct. 1062, 87 L. Ed. 1444, the 
Supreme Court of Vermont held tha.t there should 
have been a directed verdict for the defendant, 
and the Supreme Court reversed the decision of 
that court. In Blair v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 
323 U.1S. 600, 65 S. Ct. 545, 89 L. Ed. 490, the 
Suprem·e Court reversed the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania which had held that there should 
have been a directed verdict. In the recent case 
of Lavender, Administrator, etc., v. Kurn et al., 
66 S. Ct. 7 40, the :supreme Court reversed the 
Supreme Court of. Missouri which had held that 
there should have been a directed verdict for 
each of the defendants. 
''The only exception to this unbroken line 
of decisions is Brady v. Southern R. Co., 320 
U.S. 476, 64 S. Ct. 232, 88 L .. Ed. 239, where the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina was affirmed in 
its holding that there should have been a directed 
verdict. This excep~tion, however, is of little con-
sequence in view of the fact that four members 
of the court dissented. 
''The case of Lavender _v. Kurn, supra, the 
latest decision of the ·S·upreme Court, under the 
Federal Employers . Liability Act, leaves little 
room for doubt but that a directed verdict by a 
trial court for a holding by any court sustaining 
a directed verdict will not meet with favor, even 
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though the verdict involves speculation and con-
jecture. In the Lavender case, the Missouri Su-
preme Court, '189 S.W. 2d 253, 259, held: '* * * 
that it would be mere sp·eculation and conjecture 
to say that Haney was struck hy the mail hook, 
and we are constrained. to rule that plaintiff 
failed to make a submis1sible case on that ques-
tion.' In response to this holding the Supreme 
_ Court states ( 66 S. Ct. 7 44) : 'It is no answer to 
say that the jury's verdict involves speculation 
and conjecture.' A reading of the facts of that 
case, both as related by the Supreme Court and 
the Supreme Court of Missouri, reveals very 
clearly that the jury's verdict as to the cause · 
of decedent's death, especially as it applies to 
the Illinois Central Railroad, amounted to noth-
ing more than a guess on its part. 
''That the Supreme Court treats the question 
of negligence and proximate cause as a jury 
question in this class of cases is clearly shown 
by a study of these cases. Moreover, not only 
are these issues to be decided by the jury but its 
decision is unassailable. In fact, it is difficult 
to conceive of a case brought under thi:s Act where 
a trial court would be justified in directing a ver-
dict.'' 
For similar holdings see Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 
645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 692; Cogswell v. Chi.oa,go & 
Ea:stern Ill. R. R. Co., 328 U.~S:. 820, 66 S. Ct. 1122, 90 
L. Ed. 945; Keeton v. Thompson, Trustee in Bankruptcy 
for Mo. Pac. R. R. ·Co., 66 S. Ct. 135, reversing the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas, 183- S.W. 2d 505; J esionow'Ski 
v. Boston & Mali,rn R. R., 329 U.S. 452, 67 S. Ct. 401; 
Ellis v. Union Pacific R. R .. Qo., 329 U.S. 649~ 67 S. Ct. 
598. 
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In Wilkerson v. McCarthy et ·al., supr.a, 336 U.S. 53, 
69 S. Ct. 413, 420, the Supreme Court of the United 
!States speaking through Mr. ·Justice Dou_glas in a con-
curring opinion, discussed the purpose of our Congress 
in enacting the Federal Employers' Liability Act in 
insuring to injured railroad employees and their families 
their constitutional right of trial by jury in the following 
language: 
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act was 
designed to put on th~ railroad industry some of 
the cost for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which 
it consumed in its operations. Not all these costs 
were imposed, for the Act did not make the em-
ployer the insurer. The liability which it imposed 
was the liability for neg·ligence. But judges had 
created numerous defenses-fellow-servant rule, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence-so 
that the employer was often effectively insulated 
from liability even though it was responsible for 
maintenance of unsafe conditions of work. The 
purpose of the Act was to change that strict rule 
of liability, to lift from employees the '~prodigious 
burden' of personal injuries which that system 
had placed upon them, and to relieve men 'who 
by the exigencies and necessities of life are bound 
to labor' from the risks and hazards that could be 
avoided or lessened 'by the exercise of proper care 
on the part of the employer in providing safe and 
proper machinery and equipment with which the 
employee does his work.' 
''That purpose was not given a friendly re-
ception in the courts. In the first place, a great 
maze of restrictive interpretations were engrafted 
on the Act, constructions that deprived the bene-
ficia.ries of many of the intended benefits of the 
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legislation. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 
233 U.S. 492, 34 S. Ct. 635, 58 L. Ed. 1062, L.R.A 
1915C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475; Toledo, St. L .. & 
W. R. Co. v. Allen, 276 U.S. _165, 48 S. Ct. 215, 
72 L. Ed. 513 ; and the review of the cases in 
Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 
54, 62-67, 63 S. Ct. 444, 448-451, 87 L. Ed. 610, 
143 A.L.R. 967. In the second rp~lace, doubtful 
questions of fact were taken from the jury and 
resolved by the courts in favor of the employer. 
This Court led the way in overturning jury ver-
dicts rendered for employees. See Chicago, M. 
& St. P. R. Co., v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472, 46 S. Ct. 
564, 70 L. Ed. 1041; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Aeby, 
275 U.S. 426, 48 S. Ct. 177, 72 L. Ed. 351; New 
York Central R. Co. v. Ambrose, 280 U.S. 486, 
50 S. Ct. 198, 74 L. Ed. 562. And so it was that 
a goodly portion of the relief which Congress 
had provided employees was with-held from them. 
'' The first of these obstacles which the courts 
had created could be removed by Congre:ss. In 
1939 Congress did indeed move to release the em-
ployees from the burden of assumption of risk 
which the Court had reimposed on them. 53 1Stat. 
1404, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 54, 45 U.S.C.A. Sec. 54; Tiller 
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., supra. The second 
evil was not so readily susceptible of Congres-
sional correction under a :system where liability 
is bottomed on negligence. Since the condition 
was one created hy the Court and beyond effec-
tive control by Congress, it was appropriate and 
fitting that the Court correct it. In fact, a deci-
sion not to ·correct it was to let the administration 
of this law be governed not by the aim of the 
legislation to safeguard employees but by a hos-
tile philosophy that p·ermeated its interpretation . 
• 
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''The basis of liability under the Act is and 
'remains negligence. Judges will not always agree 
as to what facts are necessary to establish negli-
gence. We are not in agreement in all cases. But 
the review of the cases coming to the Court from 
the 1943 Term to date and set forth in the A~ppen­
dix to this opinion shows, I think, a record more 
faithful to the design of the Act than previously 
p·revailed. 
''Of the 55 petitions for cer:tiorari filed during 
this period, 20 have been granted. Of these one 
was granted at the instance of the employer, 19 
at the instance of an employee. In 16 of these 
cases the lower court was reversed for setting 
aside a jury verdict for an employee or taking the 
case from the jury. In 3 the lower court was sus-
tained in taking the case from the jury. In the one 
case granted at the instance of the employer we 
held that it had received the jury trial on contrib-
utory negligence to which it was entitled. In these 
20 cases we were unanimous in 10 of the decisions 
which we rendered on the merits. 
"Of the 35 :P·etitions denie·d, 21 were by em-
ployers claiming that jury verdicts were erron-
eous or that new trials should not have been 
ordered. The remaining 14 were filed by em-
ployees. In 10, of these the lower court had with-
held the case from the jury and rendered 
judgment for the ·employer, in 3 it had sustained 
jury verdicts for the e:q1ployer and in 1 reversed 
a jury verdict for the employee and directed 
a new trial. 
''From this group of cases three o bserva-
tions can be made: 
'' ( 1) The basis of liahili ty has not been 
shifted from negligence to absolute liability. 
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'' ( 2) The criterion governing the exercise 
of our discretion in granting or denying certiorari 
is not who loses below but whether the jury func-
tion in passing on disputed questions of fact 
and in dra,ving inferences from i>'roven facts has 
been respected. 
'' (3) ·The historic role of the jury in per-
forming that function, see Jones v. East Tennes-
see, V. & G. R~ Co., 128 U.S. 443, 445, 9 S. Ct. 
118, 32 L. Ed. 478; Washington & G. R. Co. v. · 
McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 572, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 1049, 
1050, 34 L. Ed. 235; Bailey v. Central Vermont 
Ry., supra, is being restored in this inmportant 
class of cases.'' 
See also .Anderso'Yp v. Atchison, Topeka wnd Sa;nta 
Fe Ry. Ca., 16 L. W. 4375; Lilllie v. Thompson, 332 U.IS'. 
459, 68 S. Ct. 140; ,Car.ay v. Southern Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 
520, 69 S. Ct. 275; P.ooly v. McCarthy et al., 109 Utah 398. 
166 P. 2d 501, 67 S. Ct. 102, 329 U.S. 6'98, 109 1Ttah 431, 
184 P. 2d 123, 67 S. Ct. 962, 330 U.S. 802. 
In the case at bar there was an evidentiary basis 
from which a jury could find that defendant railroad 
company negligently sent plaintiff into a place which 
was not reasonably safe and that said unsafe condition 
contributed as a cause of his injuries. This being true, 
plaintiff was entitled under the foregoing authorities 
to his constitutional right of trial by jury. 
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CONCL.USION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the trial court 
committed error in holding as a matter of law that 
defendant was not negligent and that plaintiff's negli-
gence was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. 'The 
trial court by its rulin_g depTived plaintiff of his inherent 
constitutional right to a fair an·d impartial trial by jury 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the judg-
ment should be reversed and the :cause remanded to the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for 
the County of ~salt Lake, for a jury trial. 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
BLACK & RO·BERTS 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff a;nd 
Aippellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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